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Universal Functional Requisites
of Society: The Unending Quest
Ovid C. Lewis
HE SEARCH FOR AN immutable and universal set of objec-
tive standards for human behavior continues unabated. In the
past this search has been identified with one form or another of the
natural law tradition.' Today sociologists, anthropologists, and
comparative jurists seem bent on
continuing the quest, most of-
THE AUTHOR: OVID C. LEWIS (B.A., ten under the guise of discover-
J.D., Rutgers, The State University;
LL.M., JS.D., Columbia University) is ing the functional requisites of
a Professor of Law at Case Western Re- society.2  At the outset, how-
serve University and is a member of the
New Jersey and Federal Bars. ever, they are met with a dif-
ficult methodological problem:
There are no uncontaminated
cultures left. Both chemical and cultural pollution seem pervasive
on our globe. When, in 1876, with the death of Lalla Rookh, the
1 Professor d'Entr~ves suggests three basic approaches to natural law: technologi-
cal, deontological, and ontological. We are here concerned primarily with the onto-
logical school which assumes that there is an ordering in the scheme of things which
is immutable, universal, and knowable, which can provide a point of departure for an
objective moral standard. d'Entr~ves, The Case for Natural Law Re-Examined, 1
NATURAL L. F. 5, 31-40 (1956). See generally E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE
332-75 (1953); Gurvitch, Natural Law, 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
284 (1933). Typical of this type of thinking is Brendan Brown's averment: "The
Natural Law creates the norm of an objective morality." Brown, Natural Law: Dy-
namic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth Century, 31 TUL. L. REV. 491 (1957).
2 Many comparative jurists are engaged in the task of discovering the basis for a
science of law. Hans Kelsen, for example, contends that a pure theory of law is at-
tained only by "a comparison of all the phenomena which go under the name of law
[which will enable us) to discover the nature of law itself, to determine its structure
and its typical forms, independent of the changing content which it exhibits at different
times and among different peoples." Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytic
Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. RE v. 44 (1941). This comparative study will provide, he
contends, a science of law, which will "comprehend all human law in one system of
norms." Id. at 70. Rdouard Lambert, who also espoused the notion that comparative
law is a science, saw its function as that of discovering "through the establishment of a
universal history of law the rhythms or natural laws of the succession of social phe-
nomena which direct the evolution of legal institutions." Lambert, Comparative Law,
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126, 127 (1930). Max Rheinstein de-
scribed comparative law as "the observational and exactitude-seeking science of law in
general .... [I]t searches for . . . law in the sense in which the word is used in the
sciences,' laws of the kind of Newton's laws of gravitation[,] . . .laws in that sense in
which the word is understood in modern natural science." Rheinstein, Teaching Tools
in Comparative Law, 1 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 98, 99 (1952). For similar views see
J. HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 10-12 (1963). Sociologists are
quite active in the quest for a common denominator to compare societies, especially
since they are acutely aware that "No comparison of a single pair of natural objects is
interpretable." Campbell, The Mutual Methodological Relevance of Anthropology
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 3: 3
Tasmanians passed into oblivion - a victim of the technologically
superior civilization that invaded the island of Tasmania, located off
the southeastern coast of Australia, our progress toward a mankind
perspective was manifest.' Clearly, if each existing cultural group
is significantly influenced by other cultures, it is impossible to say
that certain aspects of that culture are solely indigenous.4  This
and Psychology, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 333, 344 (F. Hsu ed. 1961). For
one of the most notable attempts to delineate the functional requisites of a society, see
Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, The Functional Prerequisites of a Society, 60
ETHICS 100 (1950); D. MARTINDALE, THE NATURE AND TYPES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 490-93 (1960). For a defense of functionalism, see W. GOLDSCHMIDT,
FUNCTIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY 118-39 (1966). For an analysis of Talcott Parsons'
structural-functional approach, see D. MARTINDALE, supra at 421-25, 484-90; W.
MITCHELL, SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS (1967); J. STONE, SOCIAL DI-
MENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 20-28, 609-16 (1966). The most recent school seeking
to establish transcultural principles is that of general systems theory. "General system
theory contends that there are principles of systems in general . . . irrespective of the
nature of systems, of their components, or of the relations or 'forces' between them."
von Bertalanffy, General System Theory and Psychiatry, in 3 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 705, 708 (S. Arieti ed. 1966). See generally L. VON BERTALANFFY,
GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY (1968).
3 For an account of the tragic eradication of the Tasmanians, see G. MURDOCK,
OUR PRIMITIVE CONTEMPORARIES 1-19 (1934). Professor Service characterizes his
anthropologist colleagues' reaction to the destruction of primitive cultures as one of
feeling "disheartened, sad, or even helplessly angry." E. SERVICE, PROFILES IN
ETHNOLOGY at ix (rev. ed. 1963). Anthropologists react this way for the following
reasons.
First .... our sympathies are aroused by the frequent suffering of the people,
and by the realization that much of it is caused by the ignorance and some-
times the cruelty with which 'civilized' peoples have treated them. Another
feeling . . . is a sense of the great loss to human knowledge, to art, history,
and particularly to science, as these cultures disappear. . . . Modern man is
losing this living evidence of his own past, and at the same time he is losing
the laboratory which the diversity of primitive cultures provides.
Id. at ix-x.
4 Ralph Linton's "solid American citizen" provides the classic proof for cultural dif-
fusion:
Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which
originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe be-
fore it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton,
domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from
sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was dis-
covered in China. All of these materials have been spun or woven by proc-
esses invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by
the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures
are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He
takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap in-
vented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems
to have derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.
On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins,
an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed
elements confronts him. ...
When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an Ameri-
can Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe,
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fact is responsible, apparently, for the great excitement generated
among anthropologists when Dr. Jeremiah Pangloss, the renowned
anthropologist, recently revealed that he had returned from a stay
of several years duration with a tribe that had had virtually no ex-
posure to the outside world. Dr. Pangloss' report is of course highly
significant for those who would establish universal functional req-
uisites for society. In the following pages we shall set forth briefly
what the good doctor believes he observed, and then comment on
the relevance of his report to the functional requisite issue.
Several years ago, while studying Kapauku Papuans, Dr. Pang-
loss, quite by accident, discovered a secluded valley located in the
Central Highlands of Western New Guinea. Here he found the
Zuckaroo tribe which in many respects was like the Kapauku Pa-
puans." Apparently the Zuckaroo are aware of their neighbors but
have intentionally remained isolated. There are several significant
ways in which the Zuckaroo differ from other Papuan tribes. First,
their language is far more complex and exhibits none of the trans-
cultural invariance some contend exists.0 Second, the Zuckaroo ap-
peared to Pangloss far more intelligent than any primitive tribe
that he had studied. Indeed, the cunning with which they had
avoided contact with the outer world indicates a high degree of
cognitive ability. Third, many of the norms of behavior deviated
significantly from those practiced by neighboring tribes.7
Briefly, the essential characteristics of the Zuckaroo are as fol-
lows. Physically the people are very similar to the Papuans. They
are slightly taller (153 centimeters average height of both male and
female as compared with 151.2 centimeters average height of the
derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If
he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the
Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, im-
printed in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material in-
vented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts
of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a
Hebrew diety in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American.
R. LINTON, THE STUDY OF MAN 326-27 (1936).
5 For an informative and concise account of the Kapauku Papuans, see L. POSPISIL,
THE KAPAUKU PAPUANS OF WEST NEW GUINEA (1966). The comparative jurist
will find most helpful L. POSPISIL, KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW (1958).
6 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Bar-Hillel, Syntactical and Semantical
Categories, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 57 (1967). Of special interest to us
is the recent work of Uriel Weinreich that has "cast doubts on the possibility of making
a clear distinction between syntactical and semantical categories." Id. at 61.
7 In some instances they almost appear to accept notions similar to the Dionysian
Dobu who believe that "[t]he good man, the successful man, is he who has cheated
another of his place." R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 131 (Mentor Book ed.
1946).
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Kapauku male and 142.1 centimeters average height of the Ka-
pauku female), brachycephalic (male and female cranial index 82),
mesorrhine, hair straight, wavy, curly, or wooly, and skin color a
light bronze. Obviously these characteristics do not permit an easy
classification of the Zuckaroo along conventional lines.8 The na-
tives place great emphasis on rationalism, secularism, and quantita-
tive orientation. There is no concern displayed regarding the super-
natural or religious rituals. Rather atypical of most primitive tribes,
there is an almost Benthamite preoccupation with the individual to
the exclusion of any apparent concern for the common good. This
goes so far that even the bridges used by the general populace are
owned, plank by plank, by individuals, who can at any time decide
to collect their property. This seldom occurs since it would mean
a loss of face 'to admit that one had need of something he had
loaned to others.
The most prominent persons are the troi who by one means or
another have acquired great wealth consisting generally of livestock
(pigs, marsupials, and rats), fields (in which they grow sweet
potatoes), shell money, and personal property (abaci, dice, canoes,
bamboo knives, etc.). The troi loan property in return for work
in their fields and other personal services.
It is especially interesting to learn that there is no noun for the
concept of bad or good in Zuckaroo. Instead, these concepts appear
only in -adjective form, perhaps explaining why -the natives seem to
avoid totally the reification fallacy so prevalent in our culture.
The climate is moderate, rainfall appreciable, and soil good.
Thus the Zuckaroo are able to produce abundant food without ex-
pending the time and energy that other primitive -tribes find neces-
sary. This is perhaps why they have had the time to construct a
complex language, including a fascinating number system that en-
ables them to solve in seconds complicated mathematical problems
using primitive abaci.
The Weltanschauung of the Zuckaroo is not easily explicated.
They believe that the world always has been and always will be.
Further, that they exist in order to act, especially in order to produce
elegant conceptual structures in their minds, generally mathematical.
In accordance with their stress on individualism and free will, it is
impossible for the Zuckaroo to conceive of sin. Dr. Pangloss, good
Christian that he is, during his stay with the natives continually tried
to convert them to the true faith until one day when a young Zuck-
8 See, e.g., B. BERRY, RAcE AND ETHNIc RELATIONS 45-49 (2d ed. 1958).
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aroo asked him some very disturbing questions. "How can you
think," asked the youngster with a broad grin, "that a man can sin
and have a free will, and at the same time believe that your God is
omnipotent, and that he created the world and determined all the
happenings? If he determined all that happens, and (therefore)
also the bad deeds, how can a man be held responsible? Why, if he
is omnipotent, did the Creator have to change himself into a man
and allow himself to be killed (crucified) when it would have been
enough for him to order men to behave?"' Unfortunately Dr.
Pangloss was not adequately trained in the casuistic art of theology.
Regardless of the response he gave, the youngster was able to point
to some logical inconsistency which had eluded Pangloss' discern-
ment. He finally gave up, accepting sadly that the boy, and probably
the rest of the tribe, would live forever without the blessings of
Christianity. As a corollary of the emphasis placed on individual-
ism and free will, the natives do not use the device of official sanc-
tion to coerce individuals to act according to group norms. The
sanctions appear generally to be strictly social, not legal. It is true,
however, that in some instances there is resort to a type of official
decision making. Suppose, for example, that one native wrongfully
takes the abacus of another. The individual claiming that a wrong-
ful act has been committed finds a troi (if he is a troi then he must
find a superior troi, which is determined on a strictly quantitative
basis) who will resolve the dispute through a most curious proce-
dure. First he brings the two litigants before him. Then, after
throwing dice in a manner agreed upon by the parties, he awards the
abacus to one of them. Pangloss was unable to find a neutral princi-
pal that was applied and often complained that the Zuckaroo were
violating natural justice by not treating like cases alike.' 0 The
Zuckaroo would listen to Pangloss for many hours, but he never
could convince them that the grand methods of the common law
were more appropriate for resolving their conflicts.
ANALYSIS
Dr. Pangloss reports that the Zuckaroo view man from a view-
9 L. POSPISIL, THE KAPAUKU PAPUANS OF WEST NEW GUINEA 85 (1966).
10 Professor Herbert Wechsler contends that a principled decision is one that rests
on neutral principles: "A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that
rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality
and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959). See
Lewis, The High Court: Final ...But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 528, 556
n.120 (1968).
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point similar to Cartesian dualism. Since man has mental and
material aspects, the Zuckaroo naturally ask, as did Descartes, "Who
am I?" They conclude that the Ego refers to "the thinking process
that is the cooperative effort of the body and the ... mind."" Thus
Pangloss concluded that they believe that to think is to be - cogito
ergo sum.
A people that can conceive cogito ergo sum clearly displays the
facility for elaborating a conceptual universe. Assuming for the
moment that this facility is the differentia specifica of Homo sapiens,
the quest for universal functional requisites beyond minimal physi-
cal and creature needs becomes a labor of Sisyphus. This is apparent
when we consider the significant impact of man's conceptual artifacts
on his behavior patterns.12
According to our present conceptual scheme, it is analytically
possible to distinguish the conceptual from the non-conceptual and
to identify some significant differences between them. This separa-
tion is itself artificial, since the non-conceptual is epistemologically
subordinate to the conceptual appartus in that it is always perceived
in a particular context. What we know through proception of the
universe must necessarily filter through the conceptual artifacts that
define what we mean. Thus the semeiotic and epistemological
questions are inextricably interrelated.
Our current view of external non-conceptual reality (expressed
in our relative concepts) is that it constitutes a continuum. There
are no natural joints in nature, rather our conceptual categories are
man-imposed. The accepted categories at one time separated living
matter from the rest of the universe partially on the basis that its
manifest organized complexity was in violation of the second law
of thermodynamics. While the explanation of why living matter
does not violate the second law provides the key to man's differentia,
it appears to lock the door on the quest for universal functional req-
uisites. Why this is so will occupy the remainder of our analysis.
The second law involves the energy degradation principle that
11 L. POSPISIL, supra note 9, at 87.
12 Granted the minimal "can't helps" dictated by the demands of our bio-
physical systems which must maintain equilibrium and homeostasis, it is none-
theless dear that our concepts and categories, attitudes and habits are "the
products not only of physiological and psychological constraints but also, to a
substantial degree of cultural and historical variables" [Toulmin, Neuroscience
and Human Understanding, in THE NEUROSCIENcES 822, 829 (G. Quarton,
T. Melnechuk, & F. Schmitt eds. 1967)] that produce behavior patterns and
beliefs as diverse as those of the Dionysian Dobu and Appollonian Zuni.
Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 361,
404-05 (1970).
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the entropy of a closed system can never decrease, although it may
increase. There is in fact a tendency for it to increase, which means
that "in the absence of outside interference, probability distribu-
tions tend to become flatter.' '1 3  As we have noted, living matter
seems to violate this principle since it tends to become more or-
ganized over time, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. In
1871 Clerk Maxwell posed the problem in the form of his famous
sorting demon paradox.' 4  And in 1929, Leo Szilard provided the
solution:
[Nbo . . .contradiction arises if due account is taken of the fact
that the demon (who must be considered as part of the closed sys-
tem involved) is acting on "information" concerning the detailed
motion of the gas and is actually converting information into nega-
tive entropy [negentropy]....
These investigations were remarkable for preceding the develop-
ment of modern information theory by Claude Shannon in 1948.
In this theory, information is not concerned with meaning but
with the statistical character of a whole range of possible messages
and is, in fact, the measure of the amount of freedom of choice
we have -in constructing messages. Shannon's investigation had an
important bearing on Boltzmann's statistical analogue of entropy,
for Boltzmann had left open the question of whether there might
be an even more suitable statistical analogue. Shannon specified
certain general mathematical properties which the required function
must satisfy and found that the only possible function was Boltz-
mann's.
Entropy has already been described as a measure of the amount
of disorder in a physical system, but it is now clear that a more
precise statement is that entropy measures lack of information about
the structure of a system....
13P. LANDSBERG, ENTROPY AND THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 16 (1961).
14 One of the best established facts in thermodynamics is that it is impossible
in a system enclosed in an envelope which permits neither change of volume
nor passage of heat, and in which both'the temperature and the pressure
are everywhere the same, to produce any inequality of temperature or of pres-
sure without the expenditure of work. This is the second law of thermodynam-
ics, and it is undoubtedly true so long as we can deal with bodies only in mass
and have no power of perceiving or handling the separate molecules of which
they are made up. But if we conceive a being whose faculties are so sharp-
ened that he can follow every molecule in its course, such a being, whose
attributes are still as essentially finite as our own, would be able to do what is
at present impossible to us. For we have seen that the molecules in a vessel
full of air at uniform temperature are moving with velocities by no means
uniform though the mean velocity of any great number of them, arbitrarily
selected, is almost exactly uniform. Now let us suppose that such a vessel is
divided into two portions, A and B, by a division in which there is a small
hole, and that a being who can see the individual molecules opens and closes
this hole, so as to allow only the swifter molecules to pass from A to B, and
only the slower ones to pass from B to A. He will thus, without expenditure
of work, raise the temperature of B and lower that of A, in contradiction to
the second law of thermodynamics.
J. MAXWELL, THEORY OF HEAT 338-39 (10th ed. 1891).
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The importance of negative entropy in biology has been stressed
by Erwin Schr6dinger. Any living organism delays its decay into
thermal equilibrium (death) by its capacity to maintain -itself at a
fairly high level of orderliness (and hence fairly low level of
entropy) by continually absorbing negative entropy from its envi-
ronment.15
It appears then that in our interaction with the world we pro-
ceive reality and fashion conceptual models that are "as different
from the world as a geographical map is from the surface of the
earth."'"  But although man is capable of discerning regularities
and patterns and ordering the world to suit his ends, he does not
operate in violation of the second law. Like Maxwell's sorting
demon, man responds and interacts17 on the basis of information
or negentropy,' 8 which offsets the decrease in entropy.' 9 But be-
cause of his capacity to learn and to generate alternate meanings
for similar stimuli and then "to build up and use different patterns
of interrelationships within the same set of meanings, '20 and to
duplicate and distribute this information, a seeming paradox results.
By reproducing information with a printing press are we not creat-
ing negentropy in violation of the second law? In discussing this
15 Withrow, Entropy, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 526, 528 (1967).
The relevance of Boltzmann's constant (1.3803 X 10-1 g cm 2 /sec2 degree C) to en-
tropy is easily shown. Let I1 = k In (P 0/P) = k In Po - k In P. where: Po = the
number of equally probable possible outcomes in a situation. This means that there is
no information for sorting outcomes. This is expressed algebraically as Lo = 0. With
information there are fewer equally probable outcomes.
Then I. = 0 and 1, = k In Po - k In P1 . The constant k depends on the units used.
Where "bits" or binary digits are used k =kI In physical problems units similar to
n2
entropy are used and k Boltzmann's constant.
16 L. BRILLOUIN, SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 52 (1964).
17 It had been recognized long ago that an observation required some sort of
interaction between the observer ind the observed element; but it was cur-
rently assumed that this interaction could be made very small and negligible.
For instance, looking at the object under observation was supposed to cause no
trouble! Quantum theory has completely modified the situation. The finite
quantum of action h discovered by Planck makes it impossible to go to the
limit of infinitely small action. When you look at an object, you can see it
only if you receive at least a few quanta, hv, from it. The interaction is
finite; the coupling between observer and observed object cannot be ignored.
It is impossible to make any observation without perturbing the object.
L. BRILLOUIN, supra note 16, at 52.
18 Erwin Schr6dinger suggests that living matter feeds on negentropy. See E.
SCHR6DINGER, WHAT IS LIFE? 71-72 (1945). See also Brillouin, Life, Thermody-
namics, and Cybernetics, 37 AM. SCIENTIST 554 (1949); L. BRILLOUIN, Supra note 16,
at 8.
19 See Onsager, Thermodynamics and Some Molecular Aspects of Biology, in THE
NEUROSCIENCES 75 (G. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, & F. Schmitt eds. 1967).
2 0 H. SCHRODER, M. DRIVER, & S. STREUFERT, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESS-
ING 5 (1967).
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paradox Brillouin, distinguishing absolute from distributed informa-
tion, suggested that only absolute information is bound by the sec-
ond law. As Mortimer Ostow, who most effectively resolves the
problem, points out, this is correct, since distributed information
constitutes negentropy only when perceived. In the act of creating
the organizational negentropy of this text, the author has expended
energy to make the text conform, to the extent possible, with the
mental pattern cerebration has produced. That does not mean that
there has been a transfer of the negentropy from the mind to the
written page, rather that the mental pattern has acted as a template
for the writing activity which in turn has produced a physical order-
ing of ink on the paper. Only when that ordering is perceived and
in turn used as a template is information created again. Thus negen-
tropy does not exist in vacuo. The reader expends mental effort,
more or less depending on his capacity and background, in reading
meaning into the visual ordering that confronts him by mentally
establishing relationships. Thus we may consider that the negen-
tropy "of the brain change is provided by intraneural metabolism
and that the retinal image is used merely as a template; similarly
that the negative entropy or the retinal image is provided by the
.luminous source with the object itself used as a template. ' 21
It bears emphasizing that distributed information is only as use-
ful as the perceiver's capability to assimilate it and generate rela-
tionships between the template pattern and other mental patterns.
The more knowledgeable the "knower," the more information con-
veyed.22 In dealing with complex adaptive systems that process
information, one must thus often deal with entropy and negentropy
values that depend on the definition of the initial and final stages
21 Ostow, The Entropy Concept and Psychic Function, 39 AM. SCIENTIST 140, 141
(1951). As Karl Deutsch has stated:
[A] message is not a physical object in the sense of everyday language. It is
a pattern of physical changes of physical objects. It has physical reality: it
can be measured and subjected to repetitive treatment. Only by physical
processes can it be preserved, received, transmitted, destroyed, or operated on,
in any way whatsoever. Yet it can be transferred in succession or duplication
from one set of physical objects to another. It can be in several places at
once. Unlike "matter" and "energy," "information" - that is, the patterns
that can be abstracted from messages - is not subject to their laws of con-
servation. It can be created and annihilated.
Deutsch, Some Notes on Research on the Role of Models in the Natural and Social
Sciences, 7 SYNTHESE 506, 518 (1948-49).
22 Mortimer Ostow offers the example of the mixing of solutions of a given sugar,
with one containing synthetic and the other natural sugar, which results in an increase
in entropy only to an individual with a knowledge of polarimetry. See Ostow, supra
note 21, at 143.
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of the system affected. When these variables are taken into account
the second law holds and the paradox is explained.
The conceptual models of external reality constructed by Man,
the information processor and negentropy creator par excellence,
are veridical only to the extent that the theoretical systems are
isomorphic with the existing non-conceptual systems.2 3  However,
for a variety of reasons, including Gbdel's proof,24 no model con-
structed by man can ever reflect completely all of reality, although
an overlapping of complementary models can add perspective.
One of the best examples of the necessity for developing over-
lapping models is provided by 'the apparent conflict between the
corpuscular and wave theories concerning properties of light. Cer-
tain observations support one theory, other observations the other.
Niels Bohr suggests that neither is false, rather 'they are comple-
mentary, focusing on different aspects of reality, for which no single
conceptual system yet invented is entirely isomorphic.
Complementarity entails a corollary: uncertainty (in Heisen-
berg's meaning). The example of quantum physics can explain
this relation. Let us examine an electron in motion: it may pass
through a narrow opening in a diaphragm; its position can then
be rather accurately defined, and the experiment leads to the image
of a particle in motion. However, this experiment and 'this rep-
resentation, which constitute the first aspect of complementarity,
• cannot be followed up with extreme precision. On the other hand
(second complementary aspect), we can observe interference ef-
23 Isomorphism between systems exists when there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of each system and "[the relations among the elements are pre-
served by the same corerspondence." Rapoport, General Systems Theory, 15 INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 452, 455 (1968). A well-known ex-
"ample of isomorphism between mathematical models relates mechanical harmonic
motion to the "behavior" of an electrical circuit. The behavior of a system that will
oscillate with harmonic motion where frictional forces are involved is closely approxi-
mated by the differential equation:
d2 x Rdx
M -2 + R d + kx = F(t)it 2  dt
Where M is the mass of the moving object, k the restoring force constant, x the in-
stantaneous displacement, and F(t) constitutes the external force impinging on the
mass. The isomorphism is apparent when we compare the above equation with that
representing an electrical circuit:
d 2q dq
Where L is inductance, R is resistance, C capacitance, E(t) an impressed electromotive
force, and q constitutes the charge. See HARMONIC MOTION, THE INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS 427-28 (1960); Rapoport, supra, at 455.
Another isomorphism of special interest to us is that between the equation for entropy
and for the uncertainty of a set in information theory. See Rapoport, The Promises and
Pitfalls of Information Theory, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 303 (1956).
24 See generally E. NAGEL & J. NEWMAN, G6DEL'S PROOF (1958).
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fects and thus measure a wavelength ,. This defines a momentum
p related to the wave length x. by the relation
h
p - - (L. de Broglie) ...
and leads to a wave representation. These two categories of experi-
ments limit and exclude each other. Both cannot be conducted at
once with absolute precision. That is what is specified in Heisen-
berg's principle of uncertainty, which determines the border line
between the two methods, and makes sure that complementarity
cannot turn into contradiction.
The corpuscular model and the wave model have more points
in common than was previously imagined. Thanks to the finite value
of Planck's constant h, the quantized particle and the quantized wave
yield similar values for energy and for momentum; :a "wave packet,"
as defined by Schrodinger, is located in a certain limited region
that corresponds to the "position" of the particle. If we try to
define this position too exactly, the momentum can no longer be
measured with great accuracy; the error Ax of position, and the
error Ap. of momentum, are related by Heisenberg's uncertainty
relation
Ax ApX > h [V.2]
In other words, the quantized particle has many physical properties
that make it very different from a large-size particle (say, a billiard
ball); the quantized wave, too, is very different from a sound wave
or a wave on the sea. Both models have many points in common,
and overlap nicely, but neither of them can be easily visualized and
the border between both models is defined by condition (V.2).25
Thus we are precluded from ever ascertaining the "essence" of
the universe, and instead must scan "features of 'the universe [as]
we shift range and focus back and forth between telescopic and
microscopic vision .... 26 Our conceptual instruments are never
entirely veridical, but they are useful insofar as they are isomorphic
to the particular aspect of reality on which we are focusing. We can
agree that as we move down on the scale we gain precision and lose
perspective, 7 and that as we move up "new and relevant features,
formerly unrecognizable and unsuspected," appear.2 8  Further, it
does appear that this "emerging novelty . . . reflects properties of
25 L. BRILLOUIN, supra note 16, at 53-54.
21 Weiss, I + I = 2 (One Plus One Does Not Equal Two), in THE NEuRosci-
ENcEs 801, 802 (G. Quarton, T. Melnechuk, & F. Schmitt eds. 1967).
27 The advent of computers, however, may mean that "the relative balance of ad-
vantage has shifted from simplifying a theory in order to make it solvable toward re-
taining complexity in order to increase its accuracy and realism." Newell & Simon,
Simulation: Individual Behavior, in 14 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCEs 262 (1968).
28 See Weiss, supra note 26, at 810-14.
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collectives, ' 29 and their patterns of organization and communica-
tion.8 0 We see then that organization, entropy, uncertainty, infor-
mation, and meaning are interrelated. Modern information theory
constitutes an attempt to unravel the relations. The easiest way to
appreciate what is entailed is probably best explicated by discussing
Fred Attneave's checkerboard exampleY' Consider what happens
when in a game of twenty questions a player attempts to determine
which of -the 64 squares of a checkerboard has been selected for
him to guess. He can always choose the correct square by asking
only six questions. For example, suppose the square selected was
in the position indicated by the x in Figure 1.
x
Figure 1
The following series of questions would locate the square: Is the
square: (1) on the right half of the board (Yes); (2) in the lower
half of the right 32 (Yes); (3) in the right half of the remaining
16 (No); (4) in the lower half of the remaining 8 (Yes); (5) in
29 George Simmel half a century ago wrote extensively on the emergent qualities
of groups as the number of individuals composing the group increased. "[A) group
of a certain extent and beyond a certain stage in its increase of numbers must develop
for its maintenance certain forms and organization which it did not previously need;
and ..., on the other hand, more restricted groups manifest qualities and reciprocal
activities which, in the case of their numerical extension, inevitably disappear." Sim-
mel, The Number of Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group,
* 8 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1, 2 (1902). More recently it has been demonstrated that the
very configuration of homes within a community will affect the "web of friendship"
among the inhabitants. See W. WI-IYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN 330-49 (1956).
See also Bavelas, Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups, 22 J. ACOUSTICAL
Soc'Y AM. 725 (1950); B. COLLINS & H. GUETZKOW, A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
GROUP PROCESSES FOR DECISION-MAKING 204-09 (1964).
80 See generally Lewis, supra note 12, at 370-89.
81 See F. ATTNEAVE, APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION THEORY TO PSYCHOLOGY
1-11 (1959). See generally W. GARNER, UNCERTAINTY AND STRUCTURB AS PSY-
CHOLOGICAL CONCEPTS (1962).
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the lower half of the remaining 4 (No); (6) the right square of
the remaining 2 (Yes). If 1 = yes, and 0 - no, then we can write
in the binary system the sequence of responses as 110101, which
means that only six bits are necessary to specify one alternative from
among 64 equally likely alternatives. It appears that the number
of bits of information necessary then is the power by which 2 must
be raised to equal the number of alternatives involved. We can
thus generalize and write:
m = 2H or H = log2m (1)
where: m = the number of equally probable alternatives H = the
amount of uncertainty or information expressed in bits. Since all m
are equally probable, the probability (p) of any specific alternative is
1
. Thus we may write:
m
_ 1 1
p- m or m=-m p
substituting in (1):
1
H log2- (2)P
Where the alternatives involved are not equally probable the rela-
tions involved are expressed in the following way:
Let hi = information for the occurrence of a particular alternative
p, = probability of the occurrence of a particular alternative.
Substituting in (2):
1
h = log2 - (3)
Given m alternatives, each with a specific h and p, the weighted av-
erage H is given by the equation:
H = pi hi+ p2h2 ... pihi.. pmhm
or H = Yp ihi (4)
Combining (3) and (4):
1 1
H = pi log2 -
Pi
orH=-Ipitlog2pi (5)
This formula (5) is the Shannon-Wiener measure of information.
Optimal efficiency would exist when H is at its greatest possible
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value for a given situation. This occurs when alternatives are equal-
ly probable.
Hmax = l0g2 m
The relative entropy (R) constitutes the ratio of a particular value
of H to HFax. Thus
H
logo m
Redundancy (C) is the complement to R and is expressed as:
C---R
According to the Shannon-Wiener approach the greater the re-
dundancy, the greater the certainty, with a concomitant loss in ef-
ficiency. We have already alluded to the relation of information
to uncertainty, as well as to organization, entropy, and meaning.
[I]nformation and ignorance, choice, prediction, and uncertainty are
all intimately related . . . . [I]t seems intuitively reasonable to
speak of degrees of uncertainty. The wider the choice, the larger
the set of alternatives open to use, the more uncertain we are as to
how to proceed - the more information we require in order to
make one decision. 32
Is it possible to use the Shannon-Wiener approach to establish
a transcultural measure of efficiency of information processing?
Initially this seems probable, but on closer examination this new
measure is as fictional as game theory prescriptions when actual
psychological processes are examined. When the meaning variable is
added the template conveys information only within a specific con-
text, A graphic illustration is provided by asking the reader to
peruse John Donne's poem, Loves Alchymie, to discover its meaning.
LOVES ALCHYMIE
Some that have deeper digg'd loves Myne than I, [1]
Say, where his centrique happiness doth lie:
I have lov'd, and got, and told,
But should I love, get, tell, till I were old,
I should not finde that hidden mysterie; [5]
Oh, 'tis imposture all:
And as no chymique yet th'Elixar got,
But glorifies his pregnant pot,
If by the way to him befall
32 Frick, Information Theory, in 2 PSYCHOLOGY: A STUDY OF SCIENCE 611, 614-
15 (S. Koch ed. 1959).
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Some odoriferous thing, or medicinall, [10)
So, lovers dreame a rich and long delight,
But get a winter-seeming summers night.
Our ease, our thrift, our honor, and our day,
Shall we, for this vaine Bubles shadow pay?
Ends love in this, that my man, [15]
Can be as happy'as I can; If he can
Endure the short scorne of a Bridegroomes play?
That loving wretch that sweares,
'Tis not the bodies marry, but the mindes,
Which 'he in her Angelique findes, [201
Would sweare as justly, that he heares,
In that dayes rude hoarse minstralsey, the spheares.
Hope not for minde in women; at their best
Sweetnesse and wit, they'are but Mummy, possest.13
Donne's facility for effective use of imagery, figurative language,
and metaphysical conceits enabled him to communicate with the
appropriately educated person thoughts not readily discernible to
the average reader. Did you appreciate that the search for the es-
sence, the "centrique" or "hidden mysterie" of love pursued by the
Renaissance Platonists,. is initially presented as parallel to a mining
operation, thereby suggesting the difficulty of the "digging" task?
The difficulty is transformed into a virtual impossibility (" 'tis im-
posture all") when Donne develops the conceit that the search
for love's essence is essentially like that of the alchemist's search
for the prima materia. The Renaissance Platonists contended that
love became purer and less adulterated by becoming more spiritual,
just as the alchemist's alembic purified base matter and reduced it
to prima materia. But Donne draws a different parallel: both are
frauds ("impostures"). This is so even though the alchemist may
fortuitously discover a perfume ("some odoriferous thing") or med-
icine ("medicinall") or the Platonists some incidental verity. The
ironic antithesis of the last two lines of the first stanza also seem to
involve this conceit. Lovers' dreams are like the dreams of the
alchemists and Platonists, ending in futility and frustration - not
everlasting spirituality but a "winter-seeming summers night" of lust.
The reader already notes that the elliptical nature of these conceits
requires considerable familiarity with the background against which
a8 JOHN DONNB 47-48 (J. Hayward ed. 1950).
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these pieces were written, both for identification of the conceits
and a comprehension of their significance.
In the second stanza Donne stands on its head a favorite con-
ceit of the Platonists - the notion that only fools would trade the
everlasting essence and substance of true love for the ephemeral
and evanescent shadow of love's essence, i.e., physical or sensual
love. Donne reverses the conceit and suggests that one is a fool
to trade his ease, thrift, honor, and day for an essence that has all
the substance of a ''Bubles shadow." Indeed, the lowly manservant
can find as much happiness in lovemaking as the one who attempts
to attain spiritual love. The related Platonic conceit, that since ul-
timately minds, not bodies, are involved in true love, one may evolve
from crude physical love to the highest spiritual love, is met by the
conceit that from a "'rude hoarse" minstrel one can hear ultimately
the celestial music of the "spheares."
In the pessimistic final lines Donne returns to the alchemy con-
ceit suggesting that since women are without mind the proper
alchemic "medicinall" is mummy, a drug composed of mummy
powder. "Mummy" is of course completely matter without spirit
and thus this medicine, not the prima materia (appropriate for
spiritual love), is for mindless women.
In addition to the noted conceits Donne dresses Loves Alchemy
in a veritable panoply of figurative language. There are obvious
metaphors such as "loves Myne" (line 1), "winter-seeming summers
night" (line 12), "he hears ... the spheares" (lines 21-22), and
women are "Mummy possest" (line 24). There are personifica-
tions such as "pregnant pot" (line 8) and "dayes rude hoarse min-
stralsey" (line 22). The paradox presented by -the ironic antithesis
of the last two lines of the first stanza has been noted above.
The use of puns is also rather obvious. In many cases the puns
are based on sexual colloquialisms of the time: "digg'd" (line 1),
"centrique" (referring both to essence and the female genitals, line
2), "pot" (womb and alchemist's alembic, line 8), and "'Mummy"
(alchemic drug and mummy, line 24).
The difficulty involved in ferreting out the meaning of this poem
is nothing in comparison to a situation where different languages
are involved. Then two separate symbol structures with differing
constraints impose new problems. Benjamin Whorf has taught us
that "language patterns land] cultural norms ...have grown up
together, constantly influencing each other. But in this partnership
the nature of the language is the factor that limits free plasticity
[Vol. 3: 3
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and rigidifies channels of development in the most autocratic way. ' '34
Whorf was of course influenced in arriving at this conclusion by his
teacher, Edward Sapir, who also contended that there is a linguistic
determinism that constrains culture:
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor
alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are
very much at the mercy of the particular language which has be-
come the medium of expression for their society .... The fact of
the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent uncon-
sciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two
languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as repre-
senting the same social reality. The worlds in which different
societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with
different labels attached.35
It does appear that the language acquired by a person affects his
cognitive apparatus in such a way that it is easier to learn material
that is structured in a fashion isomorphic with that language.
Miller and Selfridge and others have demonstrated that ease of
learning and retention of mean-ingful materials varies with the de-
gree of approximation to English structure. Along similar lines,
one of my students, Mr. Albert Swanson, compared the ease of
learning nonsense sequences that retained the structure of the
English sentences from which they were derived, for example,
The maff vlems oothly urn the glox nerfs
with matched materials -in which the grammatical cues had been
eliminated, for example,
maff vlem ooth urn glox nerf.36
Even though there is more information, in the Shannon-Wiener
sense, in the structured sentences, they were learned more readily
than the unstructured ones. It appears that redundancy makes for
psychological efficiency in information processing, although that
too may be culturally determined. There is today an increasing
3 4 B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 156 (J. Carroll ed. 1956).
3 E. SAPIR, SELECTED WRITINGS IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND PERSONALITY
162 (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1949). More recently William Bright has observed: Pend-
ing the outcome of extensive, strictly controlled, cross-cultural testing of the Whorfian
hypothesis, we may limit our acceptance to the following modified formulation:
Insofar as languages differ in the ways they encode objective experience, lan-
guage users tend to sort out and distinguish experiences differently according
to the categories provided by their respective languages. These cognitions
will tend to have certain effects on behavior. [Carroll, Linguistic Relativity,
Contrastive Linguistics, and Language Learning, 1 INT'L REV. APPLIED
LINGUISTICS 1 (1963).]
Bright, Language and Culture, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 18, 22 (1968).
36 Osgood, A Behavioristic Analysis of Perception and Language as Cognitive Pbe-
nomena, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 186, 191-
92 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
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awareness that the syntax of language affects behavior in various
subtle ways. For example:
[Wjords become associated whenever there is an "error of antici-
pation" - one word is expected but another is heard as one
listens to speech. Thus, words which share similar sentence en-
vironments are placed into contiguity covertly. This hypothesis is
experimentally testable and has been verified. Such formulations
suggest linguistic theories of pathological concept formation. For
example, imagine a phobic parent reiterating the sentence frames
"Don't touch the - ," or "Don't touch ," the blank
being alternatively filled by "penis," "sister," "dirt," "knives," or
"food." The frequency of such powerful conditioning responses,
over the course of years, far exceeds those used in experiments on
verbal learning and occurs during the impressionable early phases
of childhood concept formulation. Subsequent acculturation sep-
arates these nouns into different conceptual.classes for their appro-
priate use in conventional verbal communication. But it is con-
ceivable that when such conventional communication becomes
disorganized under stress, or is for some reason suspended, for
example, in word association tests, dreams, reverie on the analyst's
couch, or sensory isolation experiments, the initial grammatical
identifications will be in evidence. Attempts at conventional be-
havior under such circumstances would appear overtly deviant.37
How can we compare the Zuckaroo culture with ours and say
that at the level of symbol manipulation there are common func-
tions manifest, let alone agreeing that they are functional requisites
for maintenance of the social system? We have noted that the cul-
tural context is different, which is why we use a functional analysis.
Yet semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics are inextricably interre-
lated. As Wittgenstein already perceived, a term has meaning only
within a context. If I tell a babysitter to teach my child a game,
and she instructs him in how to play craps, I will suggest rather
vehemently that I did not have that type of game in mind."' So too
the semantic dimension of "function" is necessarily enmeshed in
the syntax of the symbol systems of a society, including not only
language,89 but all the other symbolic artifacts that make up a cul-
87 Jaffe, Psycholinguistics and Computational Linguistics, in 3 AMERicAN HAND-
BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 689, 699 (S. Arieti ed. 1966). See generally Symposium: Com-
munication in Behavior and Behavioral Science, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, April
1967, at 1.
3 8 See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 627-28 (1958).
89 Much communication occurs without words, involving not only visual-gestural
signs (kinesics), but touch, odor, warmth, and variables as subtle as the austere arrange-
ment of a lawyer's office, the dignity of a courtroom, and the barren nature of an inter-
rogation room.
The interrogator should sit fairly close to the subject and. between the two
there should be no table, desk, or other piece of furniture. Distance or the
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ture. It is at best problematical whether a transformational syntax
does exist that transcends cultural limits.40 Further, when the prag-
presence of an obstruction of any sort constitutes a serious psychological bar-
rier and also affords the subject a certain degree of relief and confidence not
otherwise attainable. . . . As to the psychological validity of the above sug-
gested seating arrangement, reference may be made to the commonplace but
yet meaningful expressions such as "getting next" to a customer by a sales-
man.
F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 14 (1962). The
second edition omits the above language. See F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 11-13 (2d ed. 1967). This probably reflects the authors'
attempt to conform to the requirements of due process enunciated in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
And where language is involved, the breaks in voice, tone, rate of talking, pauses,
and other aspects of paralanguage are of significance.
Language ... can be used to communicate almost anything. By compari-
son, nonverbal behavior is very limited in range. Usually, it is used to
communicate feelings, likings and preferences, and it customarily reinforces
or contradicts the feelings that are communicated verbally. Less often, it adds
a new dimension of sorts to a verbal message, as when a salesman describes his
product to a client and simultaneously conveys, nonverbally, the impression
that he likes the client.
A great many forms of nonverbal behavior can communicate feelings:
touching, facial expression, tone of voice, spatial distance from the addressee,
relaxation of posture, rate of speech, number of errors in speech. Some of
these are generally recognized as informative. Untrained adults and children
easily infer that they are liked or disliked from certain facial expressions,
from whether (and how) someone touches them, and from a speaker's tone of
voice. Other behavior, such as posture, has a more subtle effect. A listener
may sense how someone feels about him from the way the person sits while
talking to him, but he may have trouble identifying precisely what his impres-
sion comes from.
Mehrabian, Communication Without Words, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1968, at 53.
See also M. WIENER & A. MEHRABIAN, LANGUAGE WITHIN LANGUAGE: IMMEDIACY,
A CHANNEL IN VERBAL COMMUNICATION (1968); THE COMMUNICATION OF
EMOTIONAL MEANING (J. Davitz ed. 1964); Wescot, Introducing Coenetics: A Bio-
so~cial Analysis of Communication, 35 AM. SCHOLAR 342 (1966).
Human language has at least seven significant characteristics: duality, productivity,
arbitrariness, interchangeability, specialization, displacement, and cultural transmission.
Lawrence Fogel describes these as follows:
Duality. Human language has both sound symbols (phonology) and a gram-
matical system (morphology). The combination, called duality, is especially
useful in a communication system in which large numbers of morphemes
must be distinguished from each other, since duality is a means of coding be-
tween the message and the symbol. Although most communication between
human beings takes place through the vocal-auditory channel, other channels
are also used. Therefore, more generalized terms than phonemes (sound
symbols) and morphemes (grammatical structure) are needed to explain
duality. Hockett suggests the term cenemes for phonemes and pleremes for
morphemes. Thus no matter what the medium of communication, the ele-
ments of the communication system have names and functions.
Productivity. Human language is plerematically complex, that is, some of
the messages in the communication system consist of two or more pleremes.
Combinations of these pleremes, in infinite variety, produce new messages.
Because of this, it is possible for a speaker to make a statement that he has
never made before, or for that matter has never heard or read before, and it
is just as possible for the listener to understand the statement without realiz-
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matic variable is added we are set adrift. The Zuckaroo live in a
different symbolic universe. For example, even the fact that they
ing that the message is completely new to the speaker as well as to the lis-
tener.
Arbitrariness. If there is some natural reflection of the meaning within the
pieremes, then the meaning can be described as iconic. Otherwise the seman-
tic relationship between the pleremes and its meaning is arbitrary. Human
language is almost entirely arbitrary in its semantic conventions. (The ex-
ceptions which reflect iconicity are either wholly or partially onomatopoetic.)
Since the complexity of human language is facilitated through the property of
arbitrariness, this property has been fortuitous for the development of human
language.
Interchangeability. The individual is equipped for both transmission and
reception of messages within the same communication system. The speaker
can be a listener, the listener can be a speaker, and the speaker can listen to
his own messages.
Specialization. An action of one organism triggers behavior in another organ-
ism, but the action may also produce direct physical consequences. To gauge
the amount of specialization in a communicative system, we analyze the differ-
ence between the direct physical consequences of an action and the response
triggered in another individual. If there is slight difference, the system is not
specialized; if there is great difference, then the system is highly specialized.
For example, a shop foreman announces to his men that he will hold a meeting
with them in five minutes. The direct physical consequence is simple audible
disturbance in the surrounding area, but the response in another individual
might be the turning off of machinery and the laying down of tools, acts so
divergent from the message that the high degree of specialization in the com-
municative system is obvious.
Displacement. A message is said to be displaced when its antecedents and its
consequences are removed from the time and place of the message transmis-
sion. Any message about objects or events of the past or the future, or about
objects or events spatially removed from the transmitter or receiver, have the
property of displacement.
Cultural Transmission. Cultural transmission is the passing on of the con-
ventions of the communicative system to subsequent organisms. The genetic
structure of an individual provides some essential features of the communica-
tive system, but the individual also acquires habit, by means of cultural
mechanisms, which provides specific communicative behavior. Thus cultural
transmission change makes for efficiency of communication with respect to
changing environment. It provides means for a whole group of organisms to
findeffective communication media and so adapt at a much higher rate than
would be achieved through natural selection.
L. FOGEL, HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 329-31 (1969).
Fogel notes that "[p~roductivity and arbitarariness are only to be found in recent
human language. These properties were developed subsequent to the era of the latest
common ancestor of all Hominoidea and distinguish man from his lesser rivals. Al-
though it is not yet possible to say whether duality preceded productivity, these must
have occurred in close conjunction as an efficient means for erecting a sufficiently large
number of discriminably different signals." Id. at 332.
It is true that human language does show some trans-cultural invariance, such as
the "in" sound found in the term for mother in most cultures, connected perhaps with
the smacking of the lips. It is also true that certain words have characteristics that
enhance and sometimes transcend their meaning. In addition to onomatopoeia there
is the example of sharp sounds and words often cited. -[T]here is something rounded
and soft about the word waleula and . . . something square and sharp about quidikaka.
.G. ALLPORT, PATTERN AND GROWTH IN PERSONALITY 491 (rev. ed. 1961).
Still, all in all the symbols of human language are freely created with the symbol acting
only as a template, the creative act of giving meaning to the symbol occurring in the
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do not commit the fallacy of reification in axiological matters may
be significant. Who can say that this does not alter the eufunc-
tional value of a particular pattern of behavior? The declaratory
myth so apparent in our legal system would be dysfunctional, or at
least meaningless, for their judges. 41
Which system, ours or that of the Zuckaroo, is more adaptive?
Our approach thus far indicates that Man's differentia is the capacity
to create and live in elegant symbol systems which are not con-
strained by the first law of thermodynamics. Since these systems
are freely created,' 2 it is possible to produce worlds even more diverse
than Western culture and Zuckaroo.4" Yet, when we evaluate each,
our evaluation is in turn encapsulated in our own system perspective,
albeit at a higher level of abstraction - a critical metalanguage. 4
The capacity to formulate symbol systems, however, entails the ca-
pacity to respond to the meaning of the symbol systems, including
the metalanguage. It is this capacity that produces a qualitative
difference between the referent of natural laws of physics and the
behavior patterns of Man. Man is a complex adaptive system
operating at a high integration index level.45 Molecules, and non-
self-reflexive systems, are not affected by our conclusions concerning
their behavior. Whether we develop a strictly deterministic theory
about the behavior of atoms, or a statistical probabalistic theory,
the atoms continue to act in the same manner. But remove our
substantive conclusions about Man's behavior at both the micro-
neural processes. As Ross has pointed out "the feeling that goes with a word derives
from its meaning, not its sound. 'War,' we might say, 'is a grim and ugly word.' But
is it ugly as a word or because of what is signifies? 'Warm' is only slightly different
in sound and appearance, but it evokes pleasant emotions." R. ROSS, SYMBOLS AND
CIVILIZATION 13 (1962).
40 See note 6 supra.
41 See Lewis, supra note 10, at 540-44.
42 See note 21 supra.
4 3 See G. MURDocK, supra note 3; E. SERVICE, supra note 3.
44 H. L. A. Hart has proposed that we call the extant mores of any society "positive
morality" and those general moral principles or ideals used as criteria for evaluation of
positive morality and other social institutions "critical morality." See H. L. A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 20 (1963). After an extensive study, using a similar
dichotomy, May and Abraham Edel concluded that
the general lesson of our inquiry would seem to be that ethical concepts, no
matter how detached they are felt to be in consciousness, have cultural roots
and cultural functions, and their meaning is to be found in the offices they
perform. And criteria would seem to have a similar character. The criteria in
any evaluation of virtues, goals, ideals, needs, and so on, are other virtues, goals,
ideals, needs, more abstract or more concrete, which have become enlisted on
behalf of the ethical concepts to carry out their office in the given context.
M. EDEL & A. EDEL, ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS 226 (1959).
45 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 391-93.
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and macro-level of analysis, and his behavior would change sub-
stantially. We know that Man's evaluation is largely in the realm
of his conceptual world, and that that evaluation may be inconsistent
with his biological nature. One recalls the Romans drinking wine
preserved with lead, not realizing the deleterious effects of lead ac-
cumulation in one's body. Within their context, the behavior was
eufunctional, whereas we now view it, from our enlightened per-
spective, as dysfunctional. Whether the Zuckaroo would agree, or
,men of our own culture fifty years from now, is a matter of specula-
'tion. Because we respond to the substance or meaning of knowl-
edge, there exists not only an analogue to the Heisenberg uncer-
tainty principle where human behavior is involved (e.g., the Haw-
thorne and Rosenthal effects), 4 but a new and different type of
behavioral methodological difficulty - a substantive Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. It is contended that by a process of successive
approximation the "true" patterns of behavior may be discovered.
Unfortunately, we have agreed that our symbol systems are freely
constructed, and thus that process, rather than working itself pure,
can lead to the capacity to create a thermonuclear bomb - the
ultimate in inconsistency between enfunctional biological drives and
dysfunctional conceptual systems.47
Even if we agree that man is biologically active, and that he
can create, process, and transmit information,4 this does not mean
that he need follow any set sequence in how this is done. Most
functional requisite analyses are phenomenologically oriented, at
least to the extent of assuming a need for communication of infor-
mation. For example, the frequently cited scheme of Messrs.
Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, and Sutton begins by defining society
as "a group of human beings sharing a self-sufficient system of ac-
tion which is capable of existing longer than the life-span of an
individual, the group being recruited at least in part by the sexual
reproduction of its members."49 Here we find an assumption that a
group exists, which requires some means of maintaining interaction
between group members.5° What is meant by a "self-sufficient sys-
tem of action" is indicated by the authors' elaboration of the func-
4 6 See id. at 424.
47 For a discussion of Lon Fuller's notion that the law works itself pure and the
teleological stance of scholastic law, see Lewis, Book Review, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 349,
353-54 (1965).
48 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 401-04.
49 Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, supra note 2, at 101.
50 See E. WILSON, SOCIOLOGY: RULES, ROLES, AND RELATIONSHIPS 437 (1966).
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tional requisites necessary to maintain a society, as they have defined
it. These include: (1) provision for adequate relationship to the
environment and for sexual recruitment; (2) role differentiation
iand role assignment; (3) communication; (4) shared cognitive
orientations; (5) a shared articulated set of goals; (6) the normative
regulation of means; (7) the regulation of affective expression; (8)
and the effective control of disruptive forms of behavior.5' Aside
from the usual objections to a functional analysis52 we note that these
particular statements contain evaluative criteria that are nowhere
delineated. What is an adequate relationship to the environment?
Why, one that results in a self-sufficient system of action. This
circular process is manifest throughout normative regulation of
means, effective control of disruptive behavior, and others. The rea-
son for the apparent lapse in the critical faculty of sociologists
when they commence generating functional requisites is the impos-
sible nature of the task. We might all (members of our culture)
agree that law is one means of regulating affective expression and
controlling disruptive behavior. Many anthropologists and jurispru-
dents would contend that the Zuckaroo exhibit an institution for
resolving conflicts that qualifies as a legal system. Others would
disagree.53 But whether Zuckaroo decisions resolving abaci disputes
51 See Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, supra note 2, at 104-10.
52 See FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 7, 9, 14, 22-25, 30, 33, 78, 87,
121-24, 140, 142-43, 157-59 (D. Martindale ed. 1965). Admittedly functionalism is
a rubric that subsumes a wide variety of methodological and philosophical views. See
Dore, Function and Cause, 26 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 843 (1961).
58 The great variation in definitions of law is often noted:
Ehrlich (1936) and Petrazycki (1955) seem to regard all essential expecta-
tions-obligations as part of the living law, since they apparently locate law
in the habitual insistence of individuals rather than in public agreement. Or
one may base law and legal obligation on tacit agreement, as Hume does. Or
as with Llewellyn and Hoebel . . . one may limit law to those authoritative
norms agreed on after public dispute, and relegate tacit agreements to the
borderland of law. In this definition the existence of a court of some sort,
that is, a public dispute-settling place, is essential to the existence of law.
A still narrower definition is that of Weber ... and of Hoebel .... in which
law is limited to those norms supported by specific sanctions of specific public
officials.... Finally in the definition of John Austin . . . and his followers,
only norms sanctioned by full-time officials of a modern state are legal.
The narrower one's definition of law is, the more remote from daily life
the legal order becomes. With wide definitions such as those of Ehrlich and
Petrazycki the legal order is an intimate part of life; with narrow definitions
such as those of Austin and Gray .... the legal order is reserved for lawyers
and judges, and ordinary people have almost no contact with it.
P. DIESING, REASON IN SOCIETY 127-28 (1962). See also H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPI-HY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 556 (1949). For Ehrlich the Zuckaroo manifest
law; for Austin law is totally absent from their culture. For' an interesting critique of
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are "law," the fact is that the constellation of actors is very different
from that involved in our legal system. Further, to separate ends
'from means in this regard is extremely difficult.54 Is our commit-
ment to freedom of expression, established in our Constitution,
a means or an end? If we adopt the Tugwell constitution (a means
to an end), what effect?" Will the difference in structure pro-
duce unforeseeable results ?5 Even admitting arguendo that certain
functions must be maintained if society is to survive, there are
myriad ways in which these functions can be met, and, indeed, the
teaching of cultural anthropology is that conflict resolution is han-
dled by different societies at different times in radically divergent
ways. It may be that a social system can survive only if it changes
its structure and institutional arrangements over time. To apply
the thinking of positivistic organicism to social systems would be
the best way to assure that they do not attain ultrastability. Indeed,
to survive, function as well as structure must be altered. Imagine
the not too fanciful notion of a world in which fusion power and
automation releases Man from the arduous task of producing goods
so that he can devote his time to those things which he then con-
siders to constitute the good life. How different the functional req-
broad conceptions of law as applied to primitive societies see Timasheff, Law as a Social
Phenomenon, in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 868 (J. Hall ed. 1938). There are a
variety of theories concerning the evolution of legal systems generally. Weber main-
tains that there is a movement from charismatic to rational authority; Maine finds the
progression that of themists, unwritten law, codification, fiction, equity, legislation;
Maine's well-known view is the transition from status to contract. See generally J. HALL,
supra note 2, at 23-24. Paul Diesing suggests evolution toward legalism, which con-
sists of
(1) a trend toward complexity of distinctions and clarity of detail, such as
highly technical terms, (2) a trend toward clear and distinct hierarchical dif-
ferentiation, for example, job specification, (3) a trend toward uniformity,
equality, and universalization where differentials are not involved, and (4)
more generally, a trend toward rigidity, unchangeability, action according to
rule. Once rules are made, they may be clarified, made more precise, ex-
tended, but not changed. Of these trends, (1), (3), and (4) have clearly
occurred in Western Law, and their effects are also obvious in Roman Law.
P. DiESING, supra at 140.
54 As John Austin once observed: "[It is far easier to conceive justly what would
be useful law, than so construct that same law that it may accomplish the design of the
lawgiver." 2 J. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 1136 (4th ed. 1873). Lon Fuller not too
long ago noted that it is virtually impossible to draw neat distinctions between ends
and instrumental means for achieving those ends. See J. STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 103 (1959).
55 The Tugwell constitution appears in 3 THE CENTER MAGAZINE, Sept. 1970, at
24.
56 See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (1969).
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uisites. There is no longer the press for role differentiation and
role assignment as well as a dilution of the need for fostering the
other functional requisites listed above. It is even possible to con-
ceive of a society in which ESB is used to maintain all persons in
society in a state of euphoria from birth to death, with all condi-
tions necessary for biological survival being met by fusion-automa-
tion means. In our culture, with great emphasis placed on the value
of work and suffering to attain goals that never arrive, such a so-
ciety is almost unthinkable - certainly repulsive to our values.
And, for all we know, such a system could not long endure. The
fusion-automation institutions might not possess the plasticity that
compels us to place Man on a higher and different level than com-
puters - as presently constituted. 7  Man, and perhaps computers,
are systems capable of operating at a high integration index level.""
One of the characteristics of such a system is the capacity to behave in
a manner relatively autonomous from environmental influences by
symbol manipulation. Generally this capacity is considered as
eufunctional for survival of the system, which is another reason for
the stress placed on communication nets by those constructing so-
cietal requisites. Unfortunately, not being prescient, our capacity to
see latent dysfunctionality is severely limited. Future generations
will tell us if we did the right thing, if there are future generations.
One way out is to develop a simulation program that would per-
mit a telescoping of the time required for processes to run to the
self-destruct point. If Pangloss could capture the nuances of Zuck-
aroo society and program it into a computer, and do the same with
our society, we could see the results of our present structural commit-
ments and reevaluate them effectively. Unfortunately such a plan
is sheer daydream, for a variety of reasons, 9 chiefly because we would
always be evaluating the program from the perspective of the exist-
ing critical morality. For this reason it has been suggested that the
best decision process is one of disjointed incrementalism. 60 Un-
fortunately such an approach solves the problem by ignoring it,
since it is possible to incrementalize yourself into a position where
the next decision is a Hobson's choice into oblivion.
57 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 395 n.162.
58 Id. at 393-94.
59 Id. at 397.
60 See D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOOM, A STRATEGY Op DECISION: POLICY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 84-85 (1963).
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CONCLUSION
By now the reader is programmed to accept the view that man
possesses the capacity to create freely the conceptual world in which
,he lives. The old saying about neurotics building castles in the
sky, psychotics living in them, and psychiatrists collecting the rent,
is not too far off the mark for most of us. The difference is that we
claim our concepts are right - veridical or authentic - or some
such self-certifying justification is offered. Within a culture this
may be assumed, but as soon as the transcultural dimension becomes
involved, we cannot be so smug. Although man can freely con-
struct symbol worlds, once constructed the constraints of these
worlds are as real for us as the psychotic's castle.
A variety of means of breaking out of our conceptual cocoons
have been proposed, ranging from Frederick the Great's experiment
with children to LSD and simulation. Frederick's experiment failed
when all the children he isolated died, and simulation does not
appear too promising. Realistically, the only chance man has of
maintaining an array of alternative symbol worlds is offered by an
isolated group of individuals who are free from our constraints.
The Zuckaroo did not have our past, and without imposition by our
advanced civilization of our cultural handicaps on them, they could
have evolved to a position very different than ours. Admittedly it
would be difficult to insulate such a people from our cultural dis-
eases, especially since we so often feel righteous about sharing our
technological wealth with the rest of the world. But, short of such
a moral experiment, how else can we possess the freedom that
theoretically our information processing capability offers? It may
even be a matter of survival, since the plasticity that this capability
provides is our best chance for adaptation to a Heraclitean universe.
Unfortunately, the plasticity evaporates as we build our cumber-
some conceptual contraptions.
It is now clear why the discovery of the Zuckaroo was greeted
with such enthusiasm. Dr. Pangloss himself was acutely aware of
the tremendous implications of his find. But, as is so often the case,
his human nature got the better of him, and rather than reporting
his discovery before transacting with the tribe, he spent several
years with them. As we have seen, he even tried to convert them
to Christianity. The ideal scientist is above such things, but Jere-
miah Pangloss was all too human. And so it was that when he
realized that he had contaminated the Zuckaroo beyond redemp-
tion, Jeremiah concluded his habitation in our world and passed to
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the next. While the ultimate culture to which he ascended may
have the objective criteria he sought on earth, it is unlikely that his
enlightenment will serve those still struggling with the unending
quest.
